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The Universal Declaration and South African
Constitutional Law: A Response to Justice
Arthur Chaskalson
PETER E. QUINT*

It is a great honor to have the opportunity to respond to the
remarks of Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson. As Clinton Bamberger
indicated in his elegant introduction, Arthur Chaskalson will stand in
history as one of the founding figures in the new South Africa—first,
as legal counsel to Nelson Mandela and as guiding spirit of the Legal
Resources Centre (a focus of legal opposition to the old regime), and
then as Chief Justice and a guiding spirit (primus inter pares) of the
South African Constitutional Court. It was during his period as first
Chief Justice that this tribunal rightfully took its place as one of the
most interesting and important constitutional courts of the world.
It is fitting that Justice Chaskalson is with us today to celebrate the
60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
because the South African Constitution, as amplified by the work of
the Constitutional Court, probably reflects the values and aspirations
of that seminal document as well as any constitution existing in the
world today.
Justice Chaskalson rightly begins his discussion of these issues
with a reference to the ―inhumanity of the Nazi regime,‖1 whose
demise preceded, and in effect gave rise to, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Moreover, the history of South Africa since 1990
shares many similarities with the history of Germany from 1945,
after the end of World War II. The Nazi dictatorship took an
* Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Arthur Chaskalson, Dignity and Justice for All, 24 MD. J. INT. L. 24, 24 (2009).
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unparalleled toll in Europe, through genocide and a war of aggression
on a massive, indeed incomprehensible, scale. Over a longer period,
the South African regime under the National Party also took a fearful
toll in killings, mass removals, and the imposition of unbearable
conditions which led to injuries, sickness, and death on a scale that
will never be fully known. Both regimes based their genocidal
actions on an unsupportable theory of the ―inferiority‖ of certain
racial, religious, or ethnic groups. As Justice Chaskalson notes, the
South African regime was drawn from the white minority population,
dominating the majority black population by terror and force.2 While
the Nazi regime was probably supported by a majority of the German
people, it still represented a small minority of the vast populations of
Eastern and Western Europe that it sought to dominate and control.
Yet, in a way that still seems little short of miraculous, German
legal and political elites (under the strong hand of the western Allies)
drafted and adopted a new democratic constitution after World War
II. Over a long period of time, that constitution—which is also
interpreted and enforced by an extraordinarily strong Constitutional
Court—has come to be fully accepted and largely internalized by the
German population, which has now become one of the most
democratic and rights-conscious populations of the world. In a
parallel manner, South Africa, in its much shorter democratic history,
seems to be making its own way toward achieving similar goals.
(This is also a development that seems slightly miraculous. When I
was growing up and for many years thereafter, South Africa under
the apartheid regime was considered the most retrograde and
hopeless of all of the African countries; now, however, it seems to
be—even with all of its social, political, and economic problems—a
great beacon and guide for that continent and beyond.)
As Justice Chaskalson indicates, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights contains two basic types of rights.3 Rights of the first
type are referred to as ―negative‖ rights, rights that could well be
called ―fencing-out‖ rights.4 These are the traditional constitutional
rights that we find, for example, in the Bill of Rights of the United
States—rights of speech and religion, rights of criminal procedure
and property, and, more recently, abortion rights. These rights say to
2. Id. at 25–26.
3. Id. at 25.
4. See, e.g., Albie Sachs, Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights, 22 AM. U. INT’L.
L. REV. 673, 704 (2007).
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the government: ―You may not invade a person’s life, liberty, or
property in a particular way.‖ Thus, as noted, these are ―fencing-out‖
rights: if the state stays away and does nothing, then the rights are not
violated.
Rights of the second type, however, are the so-called ―positive‖
rights—rights that oblige the state to take some sort of positive or
affirmative action, for example by granting a measure of social
welfare to the population. These rights require the state to be more
―activist‖: if the state does nothing, its failure to act may violate
rights of this kind. Accordingly, these provisions may impose
significant obligations on the state.
The German Basic Law (Constitution) of 1949 contained both
sorts of rights, although the positive welfare provisions are generally
set forth only in very laconic and general language.5 The South
African Constitution contains both sorts of rights as well, and the
positive welfare rights are spelled out in much greater detail than they
are in the German Constitution.6 In contrast with the considerably
simpler language of the Universal Declaration,7 the formulation of
these rights in the South African Constitution is hedged with qualifications, to make clear that the rights are not absolute and will not
demand unrealistic exertions from a perhaps impoverished government. Nonetheless, in the short history of the South African
Constitution, the positive rights have occasioned perhaps more
concentrated litigation in a shorter period than anywhere else.
I would like to comment briefly on two cases that illuminate the
adjudication of the South African Court in each of these two areas—
the separate areas of ―negative‖ and ―positive‖ constitutional rights.
Justice Chaskalson points out that the role of a constitution in the
historical position of the Constitution of South Africa is, fundamentally, the task of ―transformation.‖8 (This was true, as well, of
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany after World War
II.) Not only an entire legal system, but more broadly the political
and social system of an entire country must be transformed from a
5. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] arts. 20(1),
28(1) (F.R.G.); cf. id. art. 6(4).
6. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 26 (housing), 27 (health care, food, water, and social security),
28 (children), 29 (education); see also id. s. 25(5) (equitable access to land).
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25(1), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
8. Chaskalson, supra note 1, at 30.
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type of dictatorship to a rights-based democracy. Of course, no
single judicial decision, or constitutional provision, can in itself effect
a ―transformation‖ of this type. Yet there seems to me to be one
fundamental decision in the history of the South African Constitutional Court that stands—indeed even more than other decisions—
for this form of transformation. It is a decision that Justice
Chaskalson did not discuss today—perhaps out of modesty, because
his ground-breaking opinion in that case will stand as one of the
landmarks of constitutional jurisprudence. This is the great Makwanyane case,9 one of the first cases decided by the South African
Constitutional Court, in which the Court declared that the death
penalty was unconstitutional. This was (and remains) a controversial
decision: there was no constitutional provision which explicitly
invalidated the death penalty, and Justice Chaskalson’s long and
careful opinion drew from many textual sources, including the
guarantees of life, dignity, and equality in the interim South African
Constitution. The opinion also included an influential discussion of
the use of foreign constitutional law and international law by the
Constitutional Court. Justice Chaskalson’s opinion in Makwanyane,
as well as the other separate opinions in that case, will give food for
thought for years to come—particularly, perhaps, on the important
concept of ubuntu which, when fully elucidated and understood, may
represent a unique South African contribution to comparative
constitutional law.10
But I call the Makwanyane case a ―transformative‖ decision
because it seems to me to rest, at bottom, on one very simple
proposition, and that proposition is this: ―In light of the South African
past under the National Party, there has been enough killing; there
will be no more killing, at least not by the State. Our Constitution
looks toward life, not toward death.‖ Together with other aspects of
the South African Constitution, including the choice of ―truth and
reconciliation‖ over widespread criminal penalization of the past, it
seems to me that, in this way, the Makwanyane opinion is an essential
capstone in the ―historic bridge‖ between the past and future of South
Africa.11 And interestingly, in a similar manner, the Federal Republic
9. State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
10. See, e.g., id. at 498–504 (opinion of Mokgoro, J.).
11. For the ―historic bridge,‖ see S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, epilogue (National
Unity and Reconciliation), and Chaskalson, supra note 1, at 27. For discussion of Makwanyane as a ―transformative‖ decision on grounds rather different from those advanced
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of Germany made essentially the same ―transformative‖ decision in
1949, when—against the background of the gruesome Nazi past—it
expressly prohibited the death penalty in its constitution.12
Justice Chaskalson also devotes particular attention to the development of social and economic rights in South Africa.13 Certainly rights
of this kind—although they do not exist in the Constitution of the
United States—are an essential part of the ―human dignity‖
contemplated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the
other hand, I agree with Justice Chaskalson that rights of this kind
form a problematic and difficult body of material for a Constitutional
Court that seeks to enforce them seriously. The problem is that these
rights by themselves cannot create the resources necessary for their
implementation, and there may be significant political obstacles to
the transfer of wealth that might be required to sustain these rights in
a country—like South Africa—in which, as Justice Chaskalson states,
there are great gulfs of inequality between the rich and the poor.14 As
noted, the Federal Republic of Germany, which is one of the richest
countries in the world, also has provisions of this kind. Yet the
German Constitutional Court has been extremely careful and
deliberate in enforcing these provisions, using its ―social state‖ clause
only in connection with other explicitly-guaranteed constitutional
rights.
So the real question about these positive rights is whether their
primary function will be only as an exhortation to the legislature—in
which role they may indeed have some purpose, but not probably the
purpose foreseen and advocated by their most enthusiastic proponents—or whether, as enforced by constitutional courts, these
rights may indeed have some significant independent effect.15
It seems to me that in South Africa, as elsewhere, the jury is still
out on this question. The Constitutional Court announces that the
positive rights are ―justiciable,‖16 but there may be a very thin line
between non-justiciability and the kind of deference that courts may

here, see Carol S. Steiker, Pretoria, Not Peoria, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1285 (1996).
12. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] art. 102 (F.R.G.).
13. Chaskalson, supra note 1, at 31–36.
14. Id. at 39.
15. For a discussion of this question in the German context, see Peter E. Quint, The
Constitutional Guarantees of Social Welfare in the Process of German Unification, 47 AM.
J. COMP. L. 303 (1999).
16. Chaskalson, supra note 1, at 32.
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feel impelled to give governmental judgments of fact and policy
under the ―reasonableness‖ test.
Indeed, there is principally one case in which the South African
Constitutional Court has appeared to give serious enforcement to
economic and social rights. This is the Treatment Action Campaign
case,17 in which a program was struck down for failure to extend a
certain anti-AIDS transmission treatment to an adequate number of
recipients. Yet this case involved at least one important factor that
made it a very special case: the drug manufacturer in that case had
agreed to provide the relevant anti-retroviral treatment without cost to
the government, and so the expenses of extending the treatment were
indeed much reduced. Moreover, the order of the Constitutional
Court was not as rigorous as the ―structural interdict‖ issued by the
lower court in that case,18 and it would be well worth knowing
exactly what the results of the case have been in reality.
Other decisions handed down by the Court have been more limited
in their scope. In one case (a very controversial case) the government’s failure to give dialysis treatment to a patient with chronic
kidney disease was held to be reasonable.19 In another case, the Court
found a local housing plan insufficient, but its order seemed to focus
principally on changes that would only have, at best, a very long term
effect.20 Another case, which extended certain benefits to noncitizens, may actually be viewed as a traditional equality decision.21
So the South African Constitutional Court, while no doubt one of the
most adventurous courts in this area, is still feeling its way, and the
ultimate results are still not certain. In these cases, the path from the
aspirations of the Universal Declaration to actual social reality
remains somewhat obscure.
One final note on Justice Chaskalson’s discussion of affirmative
action.22 The constitutional provisions and jurisprudence cited by
Justice Chaskalson make clear that it is constitutionally permissible
in South Africa for the state to undertake affirmative action to
compensate for past racial discrimination by government and society.
This is a position which has attracted strong minority support in the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
See id. at 763.
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.).
South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Khosa v Minister of Soc. Dev. 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Chaskalson, supra note 1, at 36–39.
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Supreme Court of the United States.23 It seems to me that it is the
correct position—not only under the explicit South African
provisions, but also in the United States under the equal protection
clause. And so it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court of the United
States, in its long trajectory of adjudication in this area, will follow
the cue of South Africa (and of India) and ultimately agree that this
form of affirmative action accords with the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States—and with the demands of
human dignity as well.

23. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362–69 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part & dissenting in part). See also
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

